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Abstract
This article shows how admission and enrollment processes affect the interpretation of simple validation
studies of academic performance. In a competitive market for students, optimal behavior of admissions
committees and applicants drives the simple correlation between test scores and performance toward
zero, regardless of the relationship in the population of prospective students. Data from our university’s
MBA program support the prediction that applicants exhibit a higher correlation between test scores and
undergraduate GPAs than do current students. This suggests that standard validation studies will understate the importance of GMAT scores in predicting performance of potential MBA students.
Abbreviations: GMAT, Graduate Management Admissions Test; GPA, Grade Point Average; GRE, Graduate Record Examination; MBA, Master’s of Business Administration

In this article, we suggest that a form of sample
selection bias makes interpretation of standard validation studies problematic. As Darlington (1998)
and Cornell (1998) point out, validation studies use
data on students who have matriculated at a particular institution. The admission procedure and acceptance decisions make these data a censored sample
from the population of prospective students. Institutions occasionally admit students with atypically low
test scores, but only if these students present other,
countervailing evidence of high ability. Students with
atypically high test scores occasionally will choose to
enroll, but only if countervailing evidence of low ability precluded their admission to higher-ranking institutions. Given that both high and low scorers exhibit
some other, countervailing evidence on ability, it is
not surprising that standardized test scores by themselves are not strong predictors of performance.
This article provides a formal model of how the selection process influences the results of standard validation studies. We find that in a competitive market
for students, optimal behavior on the part of admissions committees and on the part of applicants drives
the simple correlation between test scores and perfor-

I. Introduction
Virtually all graduate programs in the United
States require applicants to submit scores on standardized tests, such as the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) or the Graduate Management Admissions
Test (GMAT). The usefulness of these tests as predictors of graduate student performance, however, has
never been firmly established. In fact, formal statistical investigations (validation studies) typically find
that standardized tests have surprisingly little predictive content. Hanson and Harrell (1985) report a negative correlation between GMAT scores and subsequent compensation, Hansen (1971) reports very little
correlation between GRE scores and graduate grade
point averages (GPAs) in economics, and Sternberg
and Williams (1997) find GRE scores of limited use
in predicting performance in psychology. Even a recent study by the GRE Board of the Educational Testing Service (1998) shows relatively small correlations
between first-year graduate GPA and general GRE
scores. Why do admissions committees pay so much
attention to these scores when formal evidence suggests that they have little or no predictive content?
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mance toward zero, regardless of the relationship in
the population of prospective students. The key features of the model are that institutions select students
(and students self-select) based on more information
than test scores alone and that a competitive market
for students results in institutions enrolling students
of relatively homogenous predicted ability. The sample selection process generates a negative correlation
between test scores and other observable information, which, as the market becomes more competitive,
drives the simple correlation between test scores and
performance toward zero.

II. A Simple Analytic Model
Assume that a simple scalar variable, y, measures
scholastic ability in the population of potential students to a particular institution. This ability variable
will be revealed perfectly (as performance) if the student matriculates but cannot be observed before matriculation. The admissions committee at this and
other institutions must make acceptance and rejection
decisions based on observable variables that may be
correlated with this performance variable. The committee observes characteristics, xl and x2, which, for
concreteness, we interpret as the score on a standardized test and an index of undergraduate performance,
respectively. Assuming joint normality of three variables, y, xl, and x2, in the population of prospective
students, expected ability (and performance) will be
linear in the two observable variables,
E(y│1, x1, x2) = μ + x1β1 + x2β2

(1)

The observed characteristics are measured so that β1
and β2 are positive.
Consider first, the (infeasible) validation study using the population of potential students at a particular institution. The validation study would reveal predicted performance y, conditional on x1 (standardized
test scores), with expectations taken over the population of potential students,
E(y│1, x1) = μ + x1β1 + E(x2│1, x1)β2
p
21

= μ′ + x1(β1 + b β2)
where b

p
21

(2)
(3)

= cov(x1, x2)/var(x1). The coefficient on test

p
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p

scores, B = β1 + b β2, reflects not only the true mar1
21
ginal effect of test scores on performance but also the
marginal effect of x2 and the relationship between test
scores and x2 in the population. Because we presume
that test scores measure ability, we would expect a
positive correlation between test scores and underp
graduate performance in the population, (b > 0).
21
p
Therefore, B would be an upwardly biased measure
1
of the marginal effect of test scores, β1. The low correlations between performance and test scores in typical validation studies would appear to indicate that
the marginal effect of test scores on performance is
small and that institutions should give little weight to
test scores in the admissions decision.
Now consider actual validation studies, conducted
only on matriculating students. In the population
of matriculating students, the relationship between
mean performance and x1 is
ET (y│1, x1) = μ + x1β1 + ET (x2│1, x1)β2

(4)

with expectations taken over the truncated subpopulation of matriculating students at institution i. Because the truncated distribution of x1 and x2 is not
normal, the conditional expectations in (4) are not lins
ear in x1. Letting b = ∂ET [x2│1, x1]/∂x1│x = x‾ , we can
21
1
1
approximate (4) with
s
21

ET (y│1, x1) ≈ μ″ + x1(β1 + b β2)

(5)

Comparing (5) and (3) tells us that the results of the
actual validation study will differ from the hypothetical study to the extent that the relationship between
x1 and x2 in the truncated subpopulation differs from
that in the population of potential students.
To properly interpret equation (5), we provide a
simple model of the selection process. Matriculating
students are a subpopulation of the group of potential students that have passed through an admissions
filter and have then chosen to attend the institution.
Let institution i’s acceptance criterion be expressed as
the following rule:
If γ1x1 + γ2x2 > Mi, accept student.
Otherwise, reject student.

(6)
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The variables in the admissions criterion are measured so that the γ’s are positive. The next higherranking institution has the same decision rule, but
with a higher admissions standard, Mi+1 > Mi. Assuming students will always choose to attend the highestranking institution for which they qualify, the student’s acceptance criterion for the i-th institution is
If γ1x1 + γ2x2 > Mi + 1, reject offer.
Otherwise, accept offer.

(7)

The acceptance and rejection decisions on the part of
the i-th institution and the applicants make the subpopulation of matriculating students a truncated
multivariate normal with truncation rule,
Mi < γ1x1 + γ2x2 < Mi + 1

(8)

The relationship between x1 and x2 induced by the
sample selection rules follows from the results of Kotz
et al. (2000). The conditional expectation of x2 doubly
truncated by the rule, M1 < γ1x1 + γ2x2 < M2 can be expressed as
p
21

ET (x2│1, x1) = μ′′′ + b x1 + σ(φ[1]
– φ[2])/(Φ[2] – Φ[1])

(9)

where φ(∙) and Φ(∙) are the PDF and CDF, respectively, of a standard normal, with 1 = σ–1([M1 –
p
p
x1γ1]/γ2 – x1b ), 2 = σ–1([M2 – x1γ1 ]/γ2 – x1b ) and
21
21
σ is the conditional standard deviation of x2, absent
truncation.
s
Recall that we defined b as the derivative of the
21
conditional expectation in (9), evaluated at the mean
of x1. This derivative can be shown to be
s
21

b

= ∂ET [x2│1, x1]/∂x1│x = x‾
1

p
+
21

= [1 – δ(
‾ 1, 
‾ 2)] b

1

δ(
‾ 1, 
‾ 2)(–γ1/γ2)
p

(10)

where ‾1 = σ–1([M1 – ‾x1γ1]/γ2 – ‾x1b ), ‾2 = σ–1([M2 –
21
p
‾x1γ1 ]/γ2 – ‾x1b 21) and δ(
‾ 1, 
‾ 2) = 1 – varT (x2│1, x1)│x1= x‾1
s
/var(x2│1, x1). In other words, b is a convex com21
p
bination of the parameter b that describes the rela21
tionship between x1 and x2 in the population of potential students and the weights, –γ1/γ2, assigned to
x1 and x2 in the admissions rule. The weights in this
convex combination depend on the relative variances

321

of x2 in the population of potential students and the
population of matriculating students.
With these results, we can compare standard validation studies with the ideal study conducted on the
population of potential students. The traditional validation study gives a coefficient on test scores of
s

p
21

B 1 = β1 + ([1 – δ(1, 2)] b

+ δ(1, 2)(–γ1/γ2)) β2
p

p
21

= B 1 – (δ[1, 2][b

+ γ1/γ2]) β2

(11)
(12)

The second term in (12) reflects the effects of
truncation.
At one extreme, consider institutions with relatively open admissions policies that do not face competition from more highly ranked institutions. For
these institutions, the population of students is a random sample from the population of potential students. The conditional variance of x2 in the matriculating population is close to that of the applicant
s
p
s
p
population, so δ(1, 2) → 0, b → b and B 1 → B 1
21
21
. For the open-admissions institution faced with little competition, a validation study on the matriculating population will generally provide an upwardly
biased estimate of β1, the true marginal effect of test
p
scores, but provide an unbiased estimate of B 1 the
predictive content of test scores alone.
At the other extreme, consider a selective institution in a highly competitive market for students.
Here, the gap between the admissions standard at
competing institutions may be very small, Mi → Mi + 1.
2
As this gap narrows, 1 → 2, δ(1, 2) → 1, and b →
21
–γ1/γ2. The coefficient on x1 from the validation study
will be a downwardly biased estimate of the true
s
marginal effect of test scores, B 1 → β1 – (γ1/γ2)β2, and
a downwardly biased estimate of the predictive cons
p
p
tent of test scores in the population, B 1 → B 1 – (b +
21
γ1/γ2)β2.
For selective institutions in a competitive market
s
for students, the interpretation of B 1 depends on the
relative weights attached to x1 and x2 in the admissions process, γ1/γ2. The optimal weights would presumably be proportional to the relative marginal contributions to ability. If institutions place relatively too
s
much weight on test scores (γ1/γ2 > β1/β2), B 1 will
be negative, whereas if they place relatively too little
s
weight on test scores, B 1 will be positive. If institus
tions weight test scores optimally (γ1/γ2 = β1/β2), B 1
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should be close to zero. In other words, a small correlation between test scores and performance need
not indicate that test scores are useless as predictors of performance. Instead a small correlation may
simply indicate that institutions are using test scores
optimally.
III. Discussion and Conclusion
This article provided a formal model of how the
admission and enrollment process affects the interpretation of simple validation studies. Under plausible assumptions, we found that the admission and
acceptance process systematically reduces the correlation between test scores and performance relative
to the relationship in the population of potential students. Traditional validation studies may mislead institutions into ignoring useful information about the
potential productivity of prospective students.
The model assumed that institutions seek to predict performance using undergraduate performance
in addition to test scores. In practice, admissions
committees often examine a host of qualitative information (e.g., quality of recommendation letters, undergraduate coursework), whereas validation studies typically use a small number of easily quantifiable
variables. Of course, admissions decisions are sometimes based on considerations other than expected
ability, and admissions based on these other considerations would tend to mitigate the bias emphasized
in this study.
The model also assumed that each institution operates in a competitive environment where applicants base enrollment decisions solely on the ranking
of institutions. All but the very top institutions face
competition from more highly ranked programs. Of
course, to the extent that applicants weigh other factors (e.g., location, tuition) in their enrollment decisions, the hypothesized bias due to the selection process will be mitigated.
One implication of our model is potentially testable. The correlation between test scores and other
productivity characteristics should be systematically
different in the sample of matriculating students and
the population of potential students. We tested this
proposition on the sample of students and applicants
to the master’s of business administration (MBA) program at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. We cals
culated the coefficient, b from a regression of un21

in
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dergraduate GPA on GMAT scores from currently
enrolled students and compared it to the regression
p
coefficient, b using the pool of applicants as the
21
population of potential students.
s
For male applicants, we obtained ˆb = 0.0038 with
21
standard error 0.00097; for males currently in the pros
gram, ˆb = 0.0023 with standard error 0.00425. For fe21
males, as is often the case, we found the correlations
between test scores and performance to be lower for
both the matriculating and applicant sample. The esp
timate of b for female applicants is 0.0014 with stan21
s
dard error 0.00095, and the estimate of b for female
21
students in the program is 0.0007 with standard error
0.00099.
The selection process at the MBA program was not
sufficient to render the correlation between test scores
and undergraduate GPAs negative. The University of
Nebraska-Lincoln MBA program draws largely from a
regional population and does not face direct competition from higher-ranking institutions. Further, knowledge of the selection rule at UNL and competing institutions may make the pool of applicants a truncated
sample of the pool of potential students. Nevertheless, the correlation between undergraduate GPAs and
GMAT scores is almost twice as high in the applicant
pool as in the pool of matriculating students. Standard
validation studies will therefore understate the importance of GMAT scores in predicting performance of
potential students to the MBA program.
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